You can't unburn a bridge. Iranian diplomats learned that lesson the hard way in May 2018, when President Trump withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action — the nuclear deal they'd spent years hammering out with the Obama administration and five other world powers.

Now, as nuclear talks resume in Vienna, those same negotiators face an uncomfortable question: Do you make a deal with someone who already tore up your last one?

According to the New York Times, this trust deficit is casting a long shadow over current peace negotiations. Iranian leaders aren't just worried about the substance of any new agreement — they're questioning whether any commitment from the Trump administration is worth the paper it's printed on.

The stakes couldn't be higher. Iran's nuclear program has advanced significantly since 2018, when Trump reimposed crippling economic sanctions. Tehran has enriched uranium to levels far beyond what the original deal permitted, shortened its "breakout time" to produce weapons-grade material, and installed advanced centrifuges. In other words, the very problem the first agreement was designed to solve has gotten worse.

The Ghost of Deals Past

The original JCPOA took nearly two years to negotiate. It involved not just the United States and Iran, but also the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China. The deal imposed strict limits on Iran's nuclear activities in exchange for sanctions relief — a carefully balanced compromise that neither side loved but both could live with.

Then Trump campaigned against it, called it "the worst deal ever," and pulled out unilaterally. European allies scrambled to keep the framework alive, but without American participation and with renewed U.S. sanctions, the deal effectively collapsed.

From Tehran's perspective, they held up their end of the bargain. International inspectors repeatedly verified Iranian compliance. Yet they still lost access to billions in frozen assets and oil revenues. That experience has left deep scars.

What's Different This Time?

The current talks are happening in a different context. Trump is in his second term, no longer constrained by reelection concerns. Iran's economy has suffered years of isolation. And the regional security situation has shifted, with new alignments and tensions reshaping Middle Eastern politics.

But the fundamental problem remains: any agreement Trump signs could theoretically be undone by his successor, just as he undid Obama's work. And any agreement a future president signs could be undone by Trump if he were to return to office again — or by another leader who shares his skepticism of diplomatic engagement with Tehran.

This isn't just an Iran problem. It's a structural weakness in how the United States conducts foreign policy. Treaties require Senate ratification, which the JCPOA never received — it was an executive agreement. That made it easier to implement quickly, but also easier to abandon.

Iranian negotiators understand this. They're not naive. But understanding the problem doesn't solve it.

The Price of Distrust

Skepticism runs both ways, of course. American officials have their own reasons to doubt Iranian intentions, from Tehran's support for proxy forces across the Middle East to its ballistic missile program to its human rights record. Trust isn't exactly abundant on either side.

But there's an asymmetry here. The United States has options — it can maintain sanctions, rely on military deterrence, work with regional allies. Iran's economy is struggling, its currency has collapsed, and its people are bearing the cost of isolation. Tehran needs a deal more than Washington does, which should give American negotiators leverage.

Except leverage only works if the other side believes you'll follow through. If Iranian leaders think any agreement will evaporate the moment political winds shift in Washington, why make concessions? Why take domestic political heat for compromising with America if the compromise won't stick?

This is the paradox at the heart of the current talks. Iran needs sanctions relief. America wants to constrain Iran's nuclear program. A deal could serve both interests. But the history of the last deal makes a new one harder to reach.

What Happens Next

Diplomacy is often about managing risk rather than eliminating it. Iranian negotiators may decide that even a potentially temporary agreement is better than none — that several years of sanctions relief and normalized trade is worth the gamble that the deal might not survive future American administrations.

Or they may conclude that the risk is too high, that they're better off enduring sanctions while quietly advancing their nuclear capabilities, betting that time and persistence will eventually force better terms.

As the New York Times reporting makes clear, this isn't just a technical negotiation about centrifuge numbers and inspection regimes. It's a test of whether diplomacy can function when trust has been broken and institutional continuity can't be guaranteed.

The answer will shape not just U.S.-Iran relations, but the broader question of whether America can make credible long-term commitments in an era of sharp political swings. Other countries are watching. They're wondering if they'll be next to see a carefully negotiated agreement crumpled up and tossed aside.

That's the real cost of breaking deals — not just the immediate consequences, but the lingering doubt that makes the next agreement harder to reach. Iranian negotiators learned that in 2018. Now everyone gets to see if the lesson sticks.